Grappling With Self-Deception

In "The Antichrist," Nietzsche inveighs against convictions, extolling the virtues of skepticism as a manifestation of the "freedom that proceeds from intellectual power"; the man of convictions is a prisoner, inhibited by these convictions from affirming or denying the truths of the things around him. He regards conviction as a "falsehood that becomes a matter of principle because it serves a purpose."

Interestingly, Nietzsche notes that some men of conviction are possessing of more finesse than others. In this cast he groups the priests who "have borrowed from the Jews the shrewd device of sneaking in the concepts, 'God,' 'the will of God,' and 'the revelation of God' at this place." Instead of having to confront the veracity of their dogma and its associated rituals, they make pretensions to being the "mouth piece of God," invoking the "law," the "will of God," "the holy book," and "inspiration" as a means of maintaining their power.

In the course of this vituperative railing against convictions, Nietzsche makes the case for synonimity between lies and convictions. He follows with his, by now, famous contention: "The most common sort of lie is that by which a man deceives himself; the deception of others is a relatively rare offence." It is his view, then, that mendacity takes on its most common form in self-deception.

A cursory reading of Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground" yields a seemingly divergent perspective. There, Dostoevsky deals with secrets and the extent of their disclosure. There are times when man will keep secrets from everyone except his close friends and relatives. Other times, man will opt for disclosure to none besides himself. Finally, there are things man hides even from himself, afraid of acknowledging their existence.

It is your humble author's opinion that keeping secrets from oneself, nay, self-deception is, in Dostoevsky's view, not as common as Nietzsche believes it to be.

One might argue that Dostoevky viewed self-deception as not so common relative to the other forms of same, namely, keeping secrets from others and, certainly, secrets that one selectively discloses to friends, but still more common than lying to others. I'd counter that it just dosen't seem that way from his prose. Intuitively, it seems like it's an altogether rare thing, this self-deception.

While not being aware of a Talmudic perspective on the topic, the Talmud in "Berachot" does discuss the apostasy of Yochanan the high priest, who defected to the Sadducees after officiating in the temple for eighy years. The Talmud warns of man's tendency to hold himself in high regard, never fancying the possibily of a sudden downfall, an ignoble descent into heresy and debauchery. Thus, to combat the baleful tentacles of self-deception, the sages of the Talmud warned coldly that "one should suppress confidence in himself until the day he expires."

Dostoevsky's "Notes from Underground"

In "Notes from Underground," Dostoevsky's nameless narrator quotes Heine's position on the impossibilty of true autobiographies. The narrator proceeds to vouch for this truism citing man's vanity as a catalyst for gratuitous and even false willful admissions of guilt. As such, the narrator must defend his stated objective in writing down the "notes," namely, "to test whether it's possible to be entirely frank at least with oneself and dare to face the whole truth." Heine and the narrator's subsequent exposition of his belief, now obstruct the realization of the narrator's aim.

The narrator responds using dichotomic reasoning: while vanity may tempt one to slander oneself, the threat of vanity manifests itself solely in the public realm; one need not be wary of vainglorious behavior in private. Thus, the narrator may commit to writing his oppressing memory, Heine's statement notwithstanding. Deliberate misrepresentation of the particulars of this memory would be a non-issue here.

From this passage we may glean the following: 1) that there exists a compulsion, born out of vanity, to confess one's wrongdoings 2) that this vanity can even compel one to malign and slander oneself with admissions of wrongdoings that never took place. 3) that the threat of vainglorious recital of guilt is only manifest where one does so in public; in private one seldom has to deal with paroxysms of contrition.

This parallels the rabbinic position as presented in the Talmud: “R’ Kahana stated: I deem insolent one who enunciates his iniquities, as it is written: “Praiseworthy is the one who rides above sin, the one who covers up his iniquities.” R’ Shlomo Yitzhaki, the basic medieval commentator on the Talmud, writes elsewhere regarding this: “in public, for it seems that he has no shame.”

The Talmud recognizes this potential ulterior motive associated with the admission of guilt. One who nevertheless pays no heed is excoriated.

Later, Dostoevsky's narrator engages himself in finding justification for the recording of these memories in his "notes." "Why, actually," he asks himself, "do I want to write it all? If not for an audience, then couldn't I simply go over everything just in my mind, without putting it on paper?"

One justification he offers is that, this way, "it will be in better style." Yet another reason given is that it would provide him with an exercise in cathatric relief. This character is persistently haunted by oppressing thoughts as seen throughout the book. "Lastly," he says, " I am bored, and I never do anything. And writing things down actually seems like work. They say work makes man kind and honest. Well, there's a chance at any rate."

This also parallels with the Mishnaic statement in Tractate Avoth: "Shmaya said: love work." Besides the pernicious effects of indolence, one disinclined to exertion will oftentimes help himself to the fruits of others. One develops a taste for thievery and a dependancy on the communal bursary.

NOTE: See Maimonides Hilchot Teshuva 2:5, regarding R' Kahana's statement. He writes that this pertains to wrongdoings between oneself and God; one who wrongs his friend is enjoined to admit his guilt in public. See also Tractate Yoma 86b.